THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

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E. V. HAYES

Spiritual Shopkeeping

[We reprint this article from THE ARYAN PATH, July 1938. That issue contained a collation of reflections on Karma by several authors, among whom was our late good friend Mr. E. V. Hayes. He has written simply, but the article contains an important insight into how it requires a process of self-discipline and growth from within to comprehend the true meaning of great spiritual teachings which are true in themselves. Mr. W. Q. Judge offered several such instructive warnings in an essay titled "Mechanical Theosophy."—ED.]

THERE ARE certain fundamental ideas that once grasped can never be forgotten. Karma is one of these — the Law of Cause and Effect, of Ceaseless Readjustment, which underlies all true philosophy. But Man is something more than a creature of any Law, however fundamental and far-reaching; he is, as Man, a centre of unfolding self-consciousness. This unfolding, at first, is towards complexity, towards possessiveness, towards ego-self-assertion. And during this period of unfolding, to believe in the Law of Karma is to believe fully in Rewards and Punishments, to seek consolation in the fact that every injury done to oneself must have its injurious effect upon the one who injures; that those who do not live up to one's own standard of morality and right behaviour must find in Nature and the Powers behind Nature stern schoolmasters ready to wield the birch. If one does right, is unselfish, observes some certain code of ethics, suffers loss through integrity or through loyalty, then the Law will reward that praiseworthy individual.

The trouble is that the Law does appear to work that way. Not always, of course — so that much of our reward and others' punishment has to be held over until another life, here or in some other realm of consciousness. But that effect must follow cause, that in the sphere of ethical behaviour Nature does seem, roughly speaking, to reward the virtuous and to bring retribution on the wicked, can hardly be denied save by the

shallow thinker. If Man were but body and soul it would be unnecessary to travel farther; we could rest content with this primitive conception of Karma, watching the other man flounder as the result of wrongdoing and selfishness, and ourselves reaping the good effects of our righteousness — here, partially; the rest, later. But there is the Spirit in Man to take into account — the Spiritual Consciousness, which without losing its Selfhood can — and does — eventually transcend the petty self with its shopkeeping notions, its anxiety to have every wrong to itself adjusted, to receive its due for what it performs, suffers, and sacrifices.

This second stage is so different from the preceding stage of grasping, appropriation, and rough-and-ready justice, that the man experiencing it must take a different view of the laws that govern Nature's workings. Karma remains fundamental; none the less, to the second stage of unfolding consciousness, it appears so different that it almost becomes a new Law transcending Karma — as it indeed transcends the old conceptions of the clutching, appropriating self. The experience of life, plus the heightening of consciousness itself, alone can bring about the deepening sense of what Retribution is, and how little we ought to expect Reward or Punishment in the old crude sense.

Someone injures me; as a well-known example, a friend to whom I have shewn every love and consideration betrays and abandons me. My first instinct is secretly to cry upon the Powers that administer the Law to avenge me. Furtively, I ask for justice; if not, it is because I am persuaded that it is bound to happen, and my prayer is unnecessary. It must be so, I tell myself. How beautifully unselfish I was in all my dealings with this delinquent friend! How much I gave up! How completely I considered him first and myself second, if at all. How patient I was, and how pure my affection! On the other side, how callous was his treatment of me, with what lack of appreciation he accepted of my best, and with what cold seeing he witnessed my devotion! And in the final issue, how cruel were his betrayal and his misrepresentation! I must be recompensed! If I am still in the shopkeeping stage of spiritual life, I wait expectantly for my reward and his bitter regret. I wait in vain. I can see no reward attached to any of my services in the old days of friendship; I may even feel the loss of him so keenly that it looks as if I were being punished, and as though no other friend could take his place to bring some consolation. And the defaulting friend goes on merrily, forgetting me, or remembering me only to renew his misstatements and his hard antagonism; with other friends, other interests, well content.

So, in sheer necessity, for my comfort, I create a Karmic future, a hell for him on the other side of death or centuries hence upon this planet, according to my philosophy, and a heaven for myself ... without him. I

deceive myself, *the moment I touch the second stage of the unfolding of my consciousness,* if I allow this idea of Reward and Punishment to maintain its grip; if, like a hurt child, I want to hit out with my fists. As long as I am grasping, hoping, becoming rich by snatching, a spiritual octopus, then this illusionary idea of Reward and Punishment can appear real and may even assist my growth. But when I am becoming rich in myself; when from within I am sending out the perfume of my real self, it will be agony to permit this crudity to occupy my mind.

It has been said that the story of Christ may not be historically true. But psychologically it is true; it is the presentation of how a Perfect Man reacts to all the circumstances of life. Here is a Perfect Man, betrayed, abandoned, slandered, mocked, monstrously treated. What does he say? "Forgive them; they know not what they do." Are we to say that those words were mere movements of the lips; mere pose? What! From a man in his agony? Incredible! They represent the cry forced from the soul that has achieved the idea torn out of the spiritual texture of the Man horribly suffering. They assert complete abandonment of all notions of Reward and Punishment. For the simple reason: "They know not what they do."

Why do we ask that another shall be punished — and so often ask in vain? In the same spirit as some people demand floggings for certain criminals and derive sadist pleasure when such a flogging is administered. But the law that sanctions flogging and hanging is purely arbitrary; we know that. We have no right to extend our revenge urge into the realms of spiritual Law, unchanging and true. What shall we do about our injuries, our sufferings, and other people's selfishness and cruelty? In the second stage of unfolding consciousness, new ideas will present themselves, in which we shall find new understanding of life.

One is, that in this higher stage love is eternal, and the unity, not only theoretically with all, but especially with the beloved, will be most potent. To see your friend punished is to ask punishment for yourself; why add to your pain? If Christ on His Cross knew that Judas had hanged himself, He suffered more in that than in His own torment. In the appropriating stage of your inner life, while you are greedily snatching, then indeed you can say: "That old-time friend of mine — now my friend no longer — well deserves what has happened to him. See how badly he treated me! I hope it will teach him a lesson." You simply cannot say it in the further stage of growth from within — without appropriation. No, if a prophet came to you, a soothsayer, and said: "This friend of yours is going to suffer for his treatment of you; I can read it in the stars, or in some book of fate," you would cry, "It must not be! I have agonized enough for his sake; I cannot endure any more." Or your faithless friend

goes on, careless and apparently happy without you. You are desperately lonely, cruelly hurt. Compensation for you? How can there be, in wishing punishment for one you still love but who prefers to be without you? No, love and suffering are woven together; why seek to separate them? Not to suffer keenly means that one cannot really love. Take your love and your suffering in the same consecrated chalice, as a priest mingles wine and water in the Communion Cup; it is the Very Blood of Life itself; and your soul needs the mingling that it may grow.

Another idea born in the spiritually awakening heart is that none hurts us save ourselves. If you could look into the mind of your defaulting friend, you might be surprised to find how truly he believes all that he says against you; how wearied of your affection he became, and how binding he discovered your love to be. He struck out in self-defence; in the effort to free himself. What he said and did is truly him; how you reacted to it and still react is yours. You have hurt yourself; you are suffering through your own responses to his behaviour. Respond as you will, even though you suffer; it will be precious to you later. But do not desire that he shall be punished for what he has not done — wounded you. You are wounded through his action, only because you took this burning torture to your breast, holding it there while it scorched. A touch of the old appropriation still! Yet to avoid the pain would hinder your own growth. Let it burn you, but recognize that the hand that holds the torture instrument your friend provided is your own. And let the torment end as soon as it may. Don't go on for ever, in memory, reopening your wound.

One day, you will find operating another factor in awakened spiritual consciousness; intense living in the Present rather than in Past or Future. "The student must avoid pain not yet come," is one of Patañjali's *Yoga Aphorisms*. "Let the dead bury their dead," comes from another high source. Your wound will heal, if you will allow it; your love will continue, intensified; your suffering will be transmuted into *Sattva,* Harmony, Beauty, Bliss. Is not that Reward enough? Why, when you are so rich, seek barren recompense in the name of what other men call Justice? Only long that one day your friend may be as rich as you are — ask for him no other retribution from the Law. That is Freedom; the Breaking of the Chain.

E. V. HAYES

ESMÉ WYNNE-TYSON

A New Look at Hegel

[Mrs. Esmé Wynne-Tyson has been introduced to our readers more than once and readers may remember her contribution on "The Decline and Fall of the *Bona Dea*" (THE ARYAN PATH, March-April 1967). In this brief article she brings out valuable insights from Hegel's *The Philosophy of Religion* — insights which she rightly suggests would be valuable in seeking a basis for a universally acceptable framework of spiritualized philosophy.—ED.]

A REFERENCE to "Hegel's universal religion" recently found in the national press sent me hastening to what to the idealist must always be his finest work, *The Philosophy of Religion,* never needed so much as at the present time when if anything can save the world from total submergence in scientific materialism, it is a philosophy on a spiritual basis capable of unifying humanity more successfully and permanently than the current pipe-dream of a scientific Utopia. But no-one seems to be advocating such a measure. Instead, we are offered only milder, and consequently less effectual, forms of materialism, and this by churches as well as the educationists. Yet as long ago as the eighteenth century Hegel had already foreseen the desperate need for such unification, and supplied it in a remarkable work which seldom, if ever, seems to be mentioned today. On the rare occasions when the once revered name of Hegel is brought forward, it is almost invariably in connection with his *Phenomenology of Spirit* — the earliest of his important works, and cumbersome and dull to the ordinary reader.

Philosophy has been called the handmaid of religion, and she certainly has served it well, especially in the cases of Platonism and Neoplatonism, by making sense of an otherwise impossible theology for the reasoning man. Philo Judaeus, the great Alexandrian Neoplatonist, was particularly adept at this elucidation; and now the time may well have come when the clear-sighted handmaiden will have to take over from her discredited mistress the all-important task of the spiritual re-education of mankind. When this necessity is recognized, one of the chief exponents of an urgently needed antithesis to the material hypothesis will undoubtedly be found in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), one-time Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg and at Berlin.

In the heyday of European idealistic philosophy from Descartes and Kant to Schopenhauer, Hegel was greatly respected in Europe, Britain, and later by the Transcendentalists of New England; but, for some reason, he seems to have fallen into disfavour, probably because his case for the spiritual hypothesis is too logical and convincing — especially from

the source from which it comes — to be agreeable to the vast majority who are doing their best to establish the opposite world-view.

Be that as it may, a re-reading of *The Philosophy of Religion* confirms an earlier impression that the one way to combat and overcome the arguments of dialectical materialism is by its antithesis — Hegel's (and Plotinus's) dialectical idealism. Its arguments may sound at first strange and impractical to the "scientifically" brain-washed readers of today; but those old enough to remember the philosophical and metaphysical atmosphere obtaining in the first half of this century in Britain will not find them wholly unfamiliar. In fact, much of *The Philosophy of Religion* recalls ideas prevailing in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties, when there was a definite revival of Mind-and-thought worship (as distinct from the nature worship of Orthodoxy) in such sects as New Thought, Unity, The Science of Thought, Christian Science, and the teachings of the Theosophists, and such independent prophets as Aldous Huxley, whose *Perennial Philosophy* was a great aid to the spiritual unification of East and West, as were also Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's magnificent works on philosophical idealism. In addition, significant discoveries on the subject of extra-sensory perception were being made by Dr. Alexis Carrel and Professor Rhine. J. W. Dunne was busily substituting eternity for time, and Whateley Carrington was experimenting with telepathy and finding evidence for the existence of a psychon-system which could be presumed to survive physical death.

Altogether this was metaphysically an optimistic era when evidence for the continuity of life seemed at the point of appearing. Hegel's work seems to belong to this period, and it is difficult to believe that it was written over a century previously. He writes, for instance, on that fundamental topic of the nature of God and man:

> God is Spirit: in His abstract character He is characterized as universal Spirit which particularizes itself. This represents the absolute Truth, and that religion is the true one which possesses this content (Vol. III. 9–13).

Christianity, therefore, qualifies for being true by its Founder's assertion that God is Spirit and that man is His offspring. But the Brahma of the Hindus and the Nirvana of Buddhism are also this universal, all-pervading Spirit, as was TAO before them. So here is the starting-point for spiritual unification. Of this "God," Hegel writes: "God is everywhere present, and the presence of God is just the element of Truth which is in everything" (Vol. III, 33).

Here we are reminded of Gandhi's *Truth is God,* though, being no scholar, he had probably not read a line of Hegel. He was also in full

agreement with Hegel's further statement: "God alone is; God alone is the one true reality" (Vol. III, 5–7).

Of man's relation to this One Reality, he writes: "God is the Good, and Man as Spirit is the reflection of God" (Vol. III, 46); "Man is no mere natural being as such, no mere animal, but Spirit" (Vol. I, 274); and "The Spirit of Man whereby he knows God, is simply the Spirit of God Himself" (Vol. III, 303-4).

This last profound thought would be clearly understood by Vedāntists, as well as by the philosophical idealists and mystics of the West. The Eastern doctrine of *Māyā* is an essential part of Hegelian philosophy:

> The world of finitude, of things temporal, of change, of transitoriness, is not the true form of existence, but the Infinite, Eternal and Unchangeable (Vol. III, 229). ...
>
> The finite world is merely a manifestation or appearance (Vol. III, 260).

Hegel has some interesting things to say on the subject of miracles and describes the faith that makes them possible as "essentially the consciousness of absolute truth, of what God is in His true nature" (Vol. III, 87). Of the miracles themselves he writes:

> Miracles are, generally speaking, effects produced by the power exercised by Spirit upon the natural connection of things, are an interference with the course and eternal laws of Nature. But the Truth is that it is a Spirit which is this miracle, this absolute interference. Life is already an interference with these so-called eternal laws of Nature; it destroys, for instance, the eternal laws of mechanism and chemistry. The power of Spirit, and also its weakness, have still more effect on life. Terror can produce death, anxiety, illness, and so in all ages infinite faith and trust have enabled the lame to walk and the deaf to hear, etc. Modern unbelief in occurrences of this sort is based on a superstitious belief in the so-called force of Nature and its independence relatively to Spirit (Vol. III, 119).

This is a subject that might well be pondered by our allopathic Health Service which seems to know so little of the working and power of mind. Before Darwin had appeared with his materialistic theories of physical evolution, Hegel had written of the necessity of the spiritual kind, and of man's innate desire for perfection:

> Humanity has within itself the requirement that it should rise higher, and hence it seems repugnant that this demand should be suppressed, and man's aspiration tied down to continuance in ordinary finite existence (Vol. II, 52).

Here we have the answer, and a challenge, to the persistent down-dragging, degrading policy of thhe egalitarians: the certainty that man *can* "go higher" — the thought evidently behind the concept of the Kingdom

of Heaven. Of the nature of evil Hegel writes: "God is only one principle, one power; and the finite, and for that very reason Evil, has no true independent existence" (Vol. II, 74).

Once again we have the doctrine of *Māyā*, or the illusory nature of God's unlikeness, in the words:

> In so far as evil appears when a man does what is evil, it is at the same time something which is implicitly a nullity over which Spirit has power, and this power is of such a character that Spirit is able to make evil to cease to exist, to undo it ... Evil is known as something which in the Spirit is virtually and absolutely overcome, and in virtue of the fact of its being thus overcome the subject has only to make its will good, and evil, the evil action, disappears (Vol. III, 129-30).

Finally, "Good has the power to assert itself, and to annihilate the non-existent, the evil" (Vol. II, 102).

Hegel makes an interesting distinction between reason and the Divine Mind when he writes: "It is not the so-called human reason with its limits which knows God, but the Spirit of God in Man" (Vol. III, 195). Nevertheless, his philosophy is based on Mind-worship, or the worship of the Highest Good. He writes:

> Thought ... is a rising up from the limited to the absolutely Universal, and religion is only through thought and in thought. God is not the highest emotion but the highest Thought ... The opinion that thought is injurious to religion and that the more thought is abandoned the more secure the position of religion is is the maddest error of our times (Vol. I, 62).

The first necessity is to know the nature of God, and this can only be achieved by thought. How, he asks, can we obey the commandment, "Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect," if we know nothing of the perfect One?

He writes: "I am *what thinks*." On that concept the religionist and materialist can immediately unite. Have we not, therefore, in Hegel's universal philosophy, a positive and reasonable basis for the spiritual unification of mankind since even the materialists already worship mind — that all-powerful Spirit without which we cannot move a finger, or think a single thought? So whether we worship the "scientific" mind of a Marx or Mao, and believe it will eventually give humanity the answers to all its problems by external means, or the mind of a Socrates or Plotinus, concerned wholly with perfecting the inner man, which Philo described as the Father of us all, we are agreed that mind is, in fact, the highest Good we know, and this term has always been what men have meant by the word "God." Therefore, whether Mind manifests itself in the empirical philosophy of the materialists or in speculative idealism, it is in both

cases proclaiming itself as all-power, all-knowledge, all-good; for even the atheists believe that the command to be perfect may be obeyed by a sufficiently enlightened scientific mankind. If and when this faith is rudely shattered by the fact that the gods of science turn out to be demons — as, for example, in the case of wonder drugs which so often lead to addiction — humanity may at last be willing to admit that the world will never be better than the individuals who inhabit it, and be ready to enquire into the higher type of Mind which applies thought to the subject — all-important to mankind — of the inner perfectioning of the human race.

ESME WYNNE-TYSON

To have salvation from Christ is nothing else but to be made like unto Him; it is to have His humility and meekness, His mortification and self-denial, His renunciation of the spirit, wisdom, and honours of this world, His love of God, His desire of doing God's will and seeking only His honour. To have these tempers formed and begotten in thy heart is to have salvation from Christ. But if thou willest not to have these temper brought forth in thee, if thy faith and desire does not seek and cry to Christ for them in the same reality as the lame asked to walk and the blind to see, then thou must be said to be unwilling to have Christ to be thy Saviour.

—WILLIAM LAW

G. SRINIVASAN

The Dialectic of the Individual

[Dr. G. Srinivasan, Reader in Philosophy, University of Mysore, has contributed several concise and lucid philosophical essays to THE ARYAN PATH. In this brief article he uses the pattern of Hegel's dialectic to bring out the various stages through which a soul passes in its development from passivity through self-assertion to a balanced and harmonious existence as a social being; and again from social being to spiritual existence.—ED.]

HEGEL speaks of the dialectic of reason. It consists of three stages—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The dialectic of reason is also the dialectic of reality for Hegel, since reason and reality are basically one. This is a philosophical postulate which has significantly influenced the idealistic thought of the West till recently.

But what is seldom emphasized in this dialectic of the cosmos is the dialectic of the individual. The dialectic of the individual is the dialectic of his personal existence and it is a dialectic within the cosmic dialectic. It may be said to reveal the same stages of development as the cosmic dialectic does, but the stages of the individual dialectic are revealed, not to the exteriorized thinking of the individual but to his interiorized reflective thinking which is grounded in his existence, moves along with it, and captures it in its basic dynamism. This is the existential introspective thinking capable of disclosing the dialectical dynamism of human existence in its originality.

The first stage in the dialectical dynamism of human existence is the stage when the individual has not yet awakened to his individuality or personal existence. At this level of being, the individual prefers anonymity to personal distinction, "loses" himself among the "many," and reckons himself merely one of them. He does not exercise any personal decision, nor does he assume any personal responsibility for his decisions, but borrows them from others and is governed by public opinion in his actions. He constantly craves for public approval, and what others say becomes the sole determining principle of all his actions. By thus depriving himself of personal freedom, he almost enjoys a sense of tranquillity and security, which he is afraid to lose. This is the state of human "fallenness" and its three important characteristics[1] are *curiosity* (craving for constant distraction and a desire to know what things look like without a genuine interest in getting knowledge about them), *idle talk* (talking only to fill time and repeating what others say), and *ambiguity* (indulging in making

[1] MARTIN HEIDEGGER: *Being and Time*, trs. JOHN MACQUARREIE and EDWARD ROBINSON London. 1962)

vague statements without committing oneself to anything and allowing rumours to pass for truths).

The antithesis of this anonymous existence is the stage of being when the individual develops a craving to distinguish himself from others in everything so as to be recognized as the "exceptional." He rejects what others affirm and affirms what others reject, and thereby constantly sets himself against others. For what interests him is his self-distinction, no matter at what cost it is achieved. There is, no doubt, an intense exercise of individual freedom at this stage, but it is basically irrational, emotional, and egoistic. Conflict with others becomes the inevitable feature of human existence at this stage of being, and what sometimes conceals the conflict is only the dictatorial domination of one over the many.

The third stage is the stage of synthesis between the anonymous existence (thesis) and the extreme form of self-assertion (antithesis). It is a stage when the individual recognizes and respects others' freedom while exercising his own freedom. Conflict may not be completely ruled out at this stage, but neither is compromise absent. It is a stage of "loving struggle" where each individual maintains his own freedom by granting it to others as well. It is born of a realization that man is most free in a society of free persons and hence, in exercising one's own freedom, one will have to bear responsibility for others as well.[2] This sense of collective responsibility inevitably entails upon each individual a certain measure of self-sacrifice for the sake of others. Co-operation thus becomes the rule of life and conflict comes to be subordinated to it.

These three stages of the dialectic of personal existence may be regarded as arising out of the three constituents of human personality which the Sāṅkhya system describes as *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas.*[3] *Tamas* is the principle of inertia and infatuation (*moha*); its predominance over the other constituents in human personality naturally reduces man to a life of anonymity and passive submission to authority; he gives himself over to sensory pleasures completely and becomes dominated by the *indriyas* (senses). *Rajas* is the principle of activity and egoity, and its domination over the other constituents leads man towards the extreme form of self-assertion and domination over others; the *rājasik* man dwells in *ahaṁkāra* (egoity) more than in the senses and is prepared to give up the sensory pleasures if such sacrifice is found necessary to achieve the fulfilment of his egoistic craving for distinction and fame. *Sattva* is the principle of knowledge and equanimity, and its predominance over the other two constituents gives man a proper perspective of his relationship to the world;

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[2] JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: *Existentialism,* trs. BERNARD FRECHTMAN (New York. 1947), p. 54

[3] ISVARAKRISHNA; *Sāṅkhya Kārikā,* trs. S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRY (Madras. 1935)

the *sāttvik* man acts from the standpoint of *buddhi* (intellect), which determines for him the course of action he should pursue for the good of himself as well as of others; the man who dwells in *buddhi* is not controlled (or hindered) either by the *indriyas* (senses) or by *ahaṁkāra* (egoity).

The "movement" of the individual from the senses to *ahaṁkāra,* and from *ahaṁkāra* to *buddhi* is thus a dialectical movement which proceeds through "opposites" towards a synthesis; this psychological dialectical movement of human existence is, in fact, given an ontological cosmic interpretation in the Sāṅkhya system, whereby *buddhi, ahaṁkāra,* and the *indriyas* are not only distinguished from each other depending upon the predominance of one of the *guṇas* (constituents) over others but are regarded as the successive stages of *Prakṛtic* evolution and involution.

However, what the individual attains at the third stage is only the level of social and moral existence and this cannot be regarded as the end of his dialectical movement. In fact, in the Sāṅkhya system it is maintained that the main function of *buddhi* is to point the way towards man's "liberation" by providing him with discriminative knowledge (*vyaktāvyaktajña vijñāna*). What lies beyond *buddhi* is the *Puruṣa* (the individual soul), the realization of which constitutes man's "liberation" from the world. Thus, the moral and social existence reached at the third stage turns out to be a thesis and posits its own antithesis, towards which man has to take a further step.

Various are the ways in which the human destination beyond the level of moral existence can be conceived; it can be conceived as the passive, individual soul (*Puruṣa*) or as the Universal Being (*Brahman*) or as Personal God (*Īśvara*). In all these cases, however, what is sought is a spiritual and transcendent status of being, and what propels man in this search for transcendent being is the sense of the "transitoriness" of all that is in the world. There is a sense of "vacuity" which pervades one's whole existence, including the moral existence, and in order to fill up this felt "vacuity," man goes in search of transcendence. What discloses the "nothingness" of all that is, is the mood of dread, and what usually awakens man to this mood is the phenomenon of death. For death is an inevitable certainty and in foreknowing his own death, man foresees the inevitable annihilation of all his achievements and possessions in the world. Death reduces his being-in-the-world to "nothingness," since in death all his relations to the world are set at naught. This inevitable gruesome prospect of nihilation of man's being-in-the-world necessitates his quest for an eternal and transcendent status of being which will be unaffected by death.

Man's spiritual progress beyond the level of social and moral existence can however result only from a total transformation of his personality.

What was binding the individual to the world hitherto is now to be annulled and a new spiritual dimension of being is to be realized in its place. Man's triple bondage to the world — through the senses, through the principle of egoity, and through the intellect — is now to be dissolved in the experience of "nothingness," through the medium of which alone he can reach out to an eternal state of peaceful, spiritual being which was concealed hitherto.

The spiritual being which thus comes to be realized by the individual at the fourth stage of his dialectical movement is to be most unlike his egoistic existence. In his egoistic existence, man is a slave to his own ego and lives in an infra-moral relational plane of existence; but the spiritual level of being which he realizes by transcending the ethical stage must be supra-moral and non-relational. For the ego is now completely overcome and the seclusive status of spiritual being he realizes now would be non-relational. Being non-relational, it would be peaceful, transcendent, eternal, and unaffected by anything.

The question which inevitably arises at this point is whether a state of seclusive peace and aloofness can be regarded as the zenith of human spiritual realization. Even granting that man's soul would be in "contact" with the supreme Divine Being at this stage, it may still be urged that a further step in the spiritual ascent of man would be possible and necessary for the fullness of his delight.[4] This further step would naturally consist of a synthesis of man's seclusive, peaceful spiritual state of being (antithesis) with his prior social and moral existence (thesis). This synthesis is aimed at re-uniting man with the world, but this re-union differs from his prior social and moral existence in the world. For morality would now be looked upon by him, not as a compromise or contract between himself and others so as to reduce the conflict of interests, but as what is sought after and practised for one's own spiritual fulfilment. He now perceives a positive delight in self-sacrifice; for each act of self-sacrifice comes to be regarded as an act of participation in a divine mission. He now relates himself to the world, not directly or purely on a social and reciprocal basis, but indirectly through the Divine or Transcendence. This ultimate integral synthesis is the general orientation of all human existence, but each has to realize it for himself.

G. SRINIVASAN

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[4] SHRI-AUROBINDO: *The Life Divine* (New York. 1949), p. 335: "Certainly, we may prefer the absorption in a pure exclusive unity or a departure into a supracosmic transcendence, but there is in the spiritual truth of the Divine Existence no compelling reason why we should not participate in this large possession and bliss of His Universal Being which is the fulfilment of our individuality."

ALUN LLEWELLYN

The School of Stars

[Mr. Alun Llewellyn is well known to our readers by his many contributions about the philosophical content of the *Ancient Books of Wales.* This article, like many of his previous ones, is an elucidation of the astronomy-based philosophy of those ancient works and contains poetic passages impressively translated.—ED.]

THE MONK OF ST. GALL MONASTERY, writing of the noble deeds of the Emperor Charlemagne, states that when the

> illustrious Charles had begun to reign alone in the western parts of the world and the pursuit of learning had been almost forgotten throughout all his realm and the worship of the true Godhead was faint and weak, two Scots came from Ireland to the coast of Gaul along with certain traders of Britain. These Scotsmen were unrivalled for their skill in sacred and secular learning ... and they cried out and said: "Ho, everyone that desires wisdom, let him draw near and take it at our hands; for it is wisdom that we have for sale." The effect of their mission was so great that the Emperor made one, called Clement, reside in Gaul and founded a seat of learning for him, to which the noble youths of Frankland were sent for instruction; but the other he despatched to the monastery of Augustine near Pavia in Italy, "that all who wished might gather there to learn from him."

It is from this record that the identity and work of two at least of the forebears of Erigena have been rescued from oblivion; for the Monk of St. Gall expressly dates this visitation to a period before Albinus (or Alcuin) of England, disciple of Bede, made his own journey to the court of Charles the Great. Indeed, it was because Alcuin had heard how well these Irish Scots had been entertained that he thought of following them. The incident is therefore to be set in a year prior to A.D. 781, three generations before John, the Irish Scot known as Erigena, wrote his famous work on the Divisions of Nature under the protection of the great Charles and somewhat before Bede, in his *Ecclesiastical History,* sadly complained that the Celtic Church still persisted in its separate errors. The Monk of St. Gall, however, makes no such complaint; he has nothing but admiration for the combination of holy and practical teaching that was brought from the shores of the Irish Sea to the coast of Gaul.

Something of what they taught has been preserved in compilations known as the *Ancient Books of Wales* and given titles as early as the (much corrupted) *Chronicle of Nennius,* a British cleric who, in the ninth-century form his writing takes, refers to "Taliessin, Neirin and Cian" under the general head of Talhaiarn. Extant copies of these works appear to date, at earliest, from the twelfth century, when the stir of

thought in Western Europe induced a "little Renascence" in which an eager interest was re-awakened in whatever spoke of the sciences of a lost civilization. It is from the book of Taliesin (as it is spelt) that, from among more didactic and sophisticated essays, one can be taken which, in its fundamental simplicity, echoes what the Irish Clement and his companion may have come to preach. It is in a language contrived to reach the understanding of seafaring folk for whom the guidance of the stars was essential in their trade; its technical use of Numbers in the Pythagorean sense to define the course of the working heavens led it to be dismissed for a lengthy period as merely a "riddling poem" suitable to what was assumed to be the idle fancy of the Middle Ages. But it is a study of the World, of the Sun confined in its particular heaven in the skies, accompanied and followed in the night by its sister Planets, confined within the swing between Winter and Summer Solstice and steered inexorably between the fixed point of the Pole Star and the fixed line of the Meridian.

The essay (*Book of Taliesin,* Fol. 79) falls into seven sections, a probably deliberate device to underline the character of the Sphere of Sun as containing seven sectors, those of the Sun itself, the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. The analytical studies made of the functions of these bodies, of the way in which the sphere of the Sun, containing them all, formed part of the major divisions of the Universe into the five Spheres of the Night, the Stars of the Firmament, the Solar system, Ocean and the Shores within which men dwelt, are interspersed with verses which insist on the divine intelligence which created them all and must affect the mind of man with its own mystery. A striking feature is the section given over to the study of Time as rationalized in the equal reduction of hour-divisions on the sun-dial. The twenty-four-hour cycle is divided into three parts; from Dawn at Summer Solstice (4 a.m.) to Noon; from Noon to Set (8 p.m.) the same day; and the period of permanent darkness between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m., never lit by the Sun. These are given names, Europe, Asia, and Africa, which, as they stand, are clearly intended to mean Sunrise, Sunset, and the unyielding limits imposed on the march of Light. They reflect the traditional origin of these words in early Mediterranean navigation, Asia as Dawn, Europe as Evening, and the name given to themselves by Carthaginians, Afrei, or men of the south shore of the Mediterranean.

In the fifth section, which is concerned with the five major Spheres of Creation and the basic system of time-space division in groups of five degrees, it is by no means out of place to insert the terms known to classical science, *Primum Mobile, Mundus, Terra* (which in these works is always used to define Ocean), and *Terra Firma* (which distinguishes Land); for these terms were both known and frequently employed by the

authors of the *Ancient Books*. Otherwise, the Essay can speak for itself and make its own insistence on the awe with which the work of Creation was seen and the way in which the word Paradise was used as a system of intelligent Order, replacing Chaos. This was, not improbably, the first significance of the word. Its long-established interpretation as a Garden is by no means alien to the thought; and it is worth noting that Hammurabi, Great King of Babylon in 2,000 B.C., was consistently addressed by his loyal scribes as the great Gardener of the world.

Numbered Creation

All-surrounding sphere of planets
formed within the ordered firmament
wherein the body of Earth is given life
and set as the centre of the pulse of burning stars;
world of circling light in the circle of night,
seven-fold sky grouping the finite hours,
soul of the First Cause,
world beyond Earth's world of time,
soul of water, of outer air and of the breath
breathed by fruits of Earth
and by the fires folded in the sun;
metre of the stars, that measures
the pulse of all Creation.

One, in the course of Creation, the Unity —
    of the Firmament over the World.
Two, the duality of animate Light —
    the leftward turning and the rightward turning
    of the two hemispheres of Day and Night.
Three, the three interwoven rings of the World —
    the width of Day at Summer Solstice,
    at the Equinoxes
    and at Winter Solstice.
Four, the four-squared points of the Quarters
that bind Earth in their set frame.
Five, the serry of constellations
that lights the five-sphered balance of all things.
Six, the vital conjunction of the six points of Order —
    the points of North, of South, of West, of East,
    of Noon on which the tracked days round
    and the Pole Star, pivot of the orbit of Night.
Seven, the seven circuits of the system of Time
  about Earth —
    the seven planets, the Sun, the Moon,

Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn.
This is the scheme of the animate Universe,
its limits and its divisions.

A seven-walled structure formed in ether,
the stars of Earth set free in Night:
Earth's threefold structure in the nether
depths of space shaped into light.
Eternal Time itself divided
in spheres of darkness and of day
to make a mansion many-sided
for its one-regimened array.

This is the great Circle of Night,
sphering the fixed stars,
that structured the arch of Planets
over Earth's design
with the high circuit that stabilizes
the First Cause in the Sun;
with the high circuit that calculates
the swing of the Firmament
by the metre of the Moon;
with the high circuit that marks
the middle measure of the Ecliptic band
with the motion of Mars;
with the high circuit that beacons
the living spirit lighting Earth,
the way of Venus;
with the high circuit that measures
the limit of Earth's formed circle of seas,
the movement of Mercury;
with the high circuit that defines
the resistless law of movement,
Severus-Jupiter,
where Saturn frontiers the seven-fold sphere of the World
against the limit of the Firmament.
This is the great Circle that houses
the Stars, the Sun, the Planets.

These are the five forms with which
Creation binds — in Earth,
this is the order in which the Cosmos
prepared the Planets.
First, the Firmament, established
between the First Cause [*Primum Mobile*]
and Earth [*Terra*].

Second, the Planetary scheme [*Mundus*]
that followed from it.
Third, the life of men on Earth [*In-Tellus, Terra Firma*]
within the turn of the Cosmos
under the circle of ordered Light
Fourth, the Quartering of the World
prepared for man's soul [Paradise],
the inner fruition of the ripening Universe.
Fifth, the arc of Time over Earth,
born from the bordered system of Planets
and grouped in degrees of Five
within the five-sphered Universe.

The three movements created
within the formed divisions of Time,
the three rhythms of the Sun around Earth:
the first, the boundary of the Sun's emergence
at dawn, the East, which is Asia [4 a.m. to Noon];
the second, the affirmed frontiers
of the dark South, which is Africa [8 p.m. to 4 a.m.];
the third, the limit of Earth
marked by the outer sky,
the limit of sea that takes the sunset,
the West, which is Europe [Noon to 8 p.m.].
This is the quartered confine
with its three divisions,
set by the embodiment of Creation;
the compass of Space and Time.

The stars that turn in depths of night
shed from themselves the sun's ranged light,
the band of heaven that brought to birth
the ordered days that circle Earth;
so in the centre of the skies
moves the design to which Time ties
the life of Star and Earth and Man
to shape Creation's sphered plan.

The "centre of the skies" was, for this school of thought as for many others, the Pole Star, identified above all others with the supreme Intelligence. A short work from the *Book of Aneirin* (35.vi), *Gnaut I Ar Fisiolin,* may be added:

The Wisdom That Made the World

Foreknown to be fixed within the track of Time,
centre for the Sun,
defined in the aegis of its arc
through the undying Sphere that holds the Universe,
and traversed by the turning World of planets;
this is the star of Reason for Earth
rimmed by the seas.
Foreknown to be the inmost form of life
for the animate World lit by the ordered Firmament;
foreknown to be the shaped concentration
of the surgent Sun;
embraced by the seas that move
under the constellations held in by the Night;
foreknown to be the child of Ocean
and of the World of Sun that is the formed fire
of Eternity;
such is the sphere of men lorded by this star above Earth
within the heaven of the World whose line of Noon
marks the count of numbers over sea and shore.
Foreknown to be the tract for the circuit of dawns
and horizoned by the movement of the hours,
such is the life of Earth under this star,
within the living seas
shaped by the confine of the Sun.

ALUN LLEWELLYN

Cease not to think of the Universe as one living Being, possessed of a single Substance and a single Soul; and how all things trace back to its single aliveness; and how it does all things by a single impulse; and how all existing things are joint causes of all things that come into existence; and how intertwined in the fabric is the thread and how closely woven the web.

—MARCUS AURELIUS

AUGUST CLOSS

The Voices of the Nations

A Meditation on the Art of Translating

[We print below the second and concluding part of Professor Closs's long and scholarly study—ED.]

II

THE MASS OF ASSIMILATIONS from foreign languages seems to prove Don Quixote's opinion that translations are like the reverse side of an embroidered carpet. Even such strict translators as, for example, Otto Gildemeister content themselves with the hope of creating translations which allow one to feel the spirit of the original image as the reverse side shows the Gobelin. Moreover one is tempted to agree with the view that a work of art which is capable of being translated is not worth a translation. To call upon a key witness, Grillparser mentions among the disadvantages of the art of translation the following points: the poet will be brought too near to us, and the form will be spoilt by slavishly accurate renderings (cf. Sauer, XVI.46). This remark is certainly not unjustified, if we think of renderings of Rilke, for example, which all too often "clarify" the characteristic vagueness of Rilke's expressions.

The problem of untranslatability induces me to deal more fully with the theme in question. Even the slightest arrangement of words can detract from a jewel like Goethe's: "Above all the mountain tops is peace." Absolute fidelity towards the original text is, strictly speaking, impossible. Who since Lessing and the Classic Age does not know how unsuited the French Alexandrine is for the German or English law of accentuation? Even the Alexandrine of Mickiewicz, as H. Buddensieg convincingly demonstrates, is a false move in German renderings. How very much, however, the hexameter has been taken up and is suited to the German pattern of stress, needs no further defence. Apart from the already mentioned renderings of word-order and verse-form, the sound-effects of individual word-forms play tricks on the translator, so that he will willingly agree with Ortega y Gasset's observation on the "brilliance and misery" of a translator's art. To the well-known example: *wald*: *bosue*:*bois* many similar ones can be added, which like Tieck's *waldeinsamkeit* are steeped in the rich associations of the art of invoking a Romantic mood. Further associations are indicated in the author's *The Genius of the German Language* (1965), and in Priebsch-Collinson's *German Language*, in which expressions are brought forward, which have no foreign equivalents: for example: *herb, grell, sinnig, innig, duftig*; and furthermore the difference between "dark," "sinister," "murky,"

"gloomy," etc. To these can be added words like *romantisch, heimisch, raunen*; also Rilke's *Urleid* (original pain), and others. Luther says in the Letter about translating: *Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen* (1950), that the adjective *lieb* (e.g., dear God, the dear child) does not sound so heartfelt in Latin and other languages. Countless Middle High German words are also untranslatable, especially diminutives, for example, *zurnelin* (little rage); and plays on words: cf. *amor* (love), *mare* (sea), *amarum* (bitter) as in Gottfried von Strassburg's *Tristan und Isolt* (11990ff).

"Lamier" she said, "that is my need,
Lameir, makes my spirits heavy.
Lameir gives me sorrow ..."

On the other hand the Germanizing of foreign words like *esprit, gentleman,* etc., is no less difficult. The creative translator of Hölderlin and Rilke, the late J. B. Leishman (St. John's, Oxford), successfully, particularly in his later versions, achieved an excellent relation in his language to the original text by means of cognate English words; he coined for example in the *Sonnets to Orpheus* bold and new uses of words: "awaring" (*Gewahrung*), 11, 9; "overmood" (*Ubermut*), I, 20; "turf and turn" (*Wag und Wendung*), I, 11; "thrust and throng" (*Wandel und Gang*), I, 19; in addition he has successfully carried over into English Rilke's expressions which have double meanings: "overstepping," I, 8: "transform," I, 10.

On the German side the distinguished scholar of English, Levin L. Schucking, has produced the translations: *English Poems from Seven Centuries* (1956) which he accompanied with a wistful remark in the margin as to the impossibilities of translation: "The translation cannot, unfortunately, imitate the rich use which the author ... makes of alliteration throughout."

In the face of such limitations as regards translating foreign languages, the translator must appear to many an already wounded person, even though not a conquered one, who enters the battle.

In the adaptation of symbols there lies for the translator an often unbridgeable gulf between original and translation, cf. Ortega y Gasset's *Brilliance and wretchedness of translation,* 1c. 617). In Arabic there are, I understand, some 5,714 terms for "camel." It becomes obvious that it will not be easy for a nomad from the Arabian desert to make himself understood by a manufacturer from Glasgow when discussing the humpbacked animal! The languages diverge not so much because they produce different sounds but because they are rooted in different inner pictures and different innate verse forms.

Language is the expression and image of the social, religious, and intel-

lectual culture of a person or a people. The differences to be found in the countryside impress themselves deeply in the poetic word, as Eugene Nida in "Linguistics and Ethnology in Translation Problems" (*Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New York,* August 1945, I, 194) shows with exciting examples from Bible translations: "It is often difficult in tropical countries to render the word 'desert' as a place which has sparse vegetation." Therefore the expression "abandoned place" is suggested as translation for "desert." Another example is offered by the expression: "children of the bridegroom" = *Hochzeitsgaste* (Matth., IX.15), which was misunderstood in the Bantu language as "children of the house of the man who marries the woman"; or the compound: "bill of divorcement" = (*Scheidebrief*) (Mark, X.4) which is unintelligible to the Totonacs in Mexico, as with these a case of divorce is (against payment) settled by the simple process of deleting the names of the married couple in the town register.

To this must be added the complexity of several different parts of speech which cannot be taken over as they stand into the system of constructions of another language. In conclusion it may be of interest, that, for example, East Aztec has no passive form; and thus the words of the Bible: "Judge not, that ye be not judged" must be turned into the active: "Judge not, so that God will not judge you."

On the other hand another eminent scholar in the field of anthropolgy and translation, E. Sapir, is of the opinion that everything can be said in every language in the world; that thus Kant's philosophy could be expressed in the language of the Eskimos. It would seem to us in any case easier to master the differences of gender of *sol* and *luna* — *die Sonne* and *der Mond,* or the translation of *die Schlange the snake* (Satan = he) in Milton's *Paradise Lost,* than to credit the Eskimos with the ethics of the European philosophy of life!

Under the impression of the above proof of the difficulties of translating foreign literature, our attention is drawn more than ever on to the fact that every art-form has its own peculiar laws. The notorious "prose versions" of the "contents" of poems are a good reason for believing that the choice of words and interplay of sounds and visual images lie beyond the boundaries of logical representation of the artistic material. We must here look more deeply into the problem than, for example, does A. Holz in his discussion of the line: "Behind the blossoming boughs of the apple tree rises the moon," pertinent as it may be. Every successful translation is at the same time a creative transformation which alters the character of the image with the language; it is not only mediation between the original text and a copy, but a magic spell which reflects the original as in a mirror and is yet tuned differently, for the associations of sounds and images of the rhythm-bound work must naturally, despite inner and

outward assimilation, retain their peculiar stamp in the foreign language. Hence springs the so lightly used reproach: "Translator = traitor!" — *traduttore = traditore.* Even the title of a book has often no proper equivalent; for example, *Gone with the Wind* has a much more expressive ring in the German title *Vom Winde Verweht.*

The mystery which separates the original from the translation is revealed in Faust's famous rendering of St. John's Gospel: *"In principio erat verbum"*; this key-word (*Logos*) is translated by: *Wort, Sinn, Kraft, Tat.* Moreover, C. Rabin ("The Linguistics of Translation" in *Aspects of Translation,* 1958) refers to the various Hebrew equivalents of "to wash," according to the objects (body, hands, clothes, floor). The translation of idiomatic phrases offer a world in themselves. According to Luther's famous dictum in his *Sendbrief,* the real interpreter must gather the expressions from the very mouth of the people, from the mother at home, the child in the street, the common man in the market. In the same chapter Luther proposes for *"ex abundantia cordis os loquitur"* the idiomatic German version: *"Wes das Herz voll ist, geht der Mund uber."* The German language seems to be an especially well-favoured one in adjustability and adaptability as opposed to some other foreign tongues. Goethe spoke of the great flexibility of the German expression. In world-famous and recognized translations from Homer, Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Chinese wisdom (*I-Ching: Books of Changes,* translated by Richard Wilhelm), etc., that power to incorporate the "voices of the nations" into its language clearly manifests itself. However, the translations of the three following verb forms serve to show how difficult the task of German (or English) is in contrast to the pregnancy of Latin:

Motus eris: You will have been moved: *Du wirst bewegt worden sein.*
Moveberis: You will be moved: *Du wirst bewegt werden.*
Ignoravisses: You would not have known: *Du wurdest (es) nicht gewusst haben.*

Professor H. Oppel carried out (in the *Zschft für Deutschkunde,* 1939, Vol. 5) an evaluating comparison between German writings and foreign translations — with three results which intelligently and concisely enforce our problem: (*a*) The translation reveals aspects of the peculiarity of the actual work that might otherwise remain unseen by us; e.g., cf. Hebbel's Aphorisms on Death with the French translation which transforms the original, or Goethe's *Prologue* with Shelley's brilliant translation. (*b*) Only through the translation does a poetic work with its own rules and in its relation between meaning and sound, etc., finally become clear. (*c*) The writer can express his profoundest ideas only from the fullness of his own natural, national expression. We can see this above all

in the contrast between the "social" speech of the Frenchman and the "absolute" speech of the great German poets. According to Heine, translating German lyrical poetry into French verse was like trying to bottle moonlight. H. Oppel (*l.c.*) shows how and why in French the desire structure forces the translator to treat the original version (Hebbel's Aphorisms on Death) with rationalizing clarity: *"Un mort fait sur le spectateur l'effet de la mort; il semble qu'il n'ait qu'a lever ses cils pour que la fleche parte ..." (Ein Toter wirkt auf den, der ihn sieht, wie der Tod selbst; man glaubt, er Konnte die Wimper heben, und dann musste der Pfeil herausfahren).*

At the beginning of the century a penetrating understanding of the "*Work of art in words,*" the so-called *Wortkunst,* was already embarked on by O. Walzel and his school. In *Leben, Erleben, und Dichtung* (1912) he compares Verlaine's *Colloque Sentimental* with two German translations of equal value: one is by Stefan George ("In the lonely old park where there was frost") and the other by Leo Greiner ("In the old park, silent and grey"). Both translations strive to reproduce Verlaine' onomatopoeia with "a" and "o" following each other, and rhyme schemes; yet both use a different meter (four feet and five feet), and nevertheless both achieve an astounding closeness, both musically and in the content, to the original poem.

So it is not to be wondered at if, recently, new versions or translations are taken as a material for comparisons with the original text, in order to be able to weigh the advantages or disadvantages of each individual work.

Ambiguity of expressions is rarely translated with such brilliant effect as: "Is life worth living? ... It depends upon the liver" into the French "*La viet vaut-elle la peine? ... Question de foie*" (G. C. COULT: *Fourscore Years,* 1943). Also the ambiguous expressions: "She cannot bear children" and "Those men are revolting" (A. D. BOOTH: "The History and Recent Progress of Machine Translation," in *Aspects of Translation, l.c.*)

It is worth noticing that the present intellectual situation is often reflected in the field of contemporary translations, particularly as regards translations from English into German, e.g., Walter Schurenberg, the translator of E. M. Forster and F. Scott Fitzgerald, prophesies a leaning towards English (in *Akzente,* 5/1956), above all a marked influence of the English upon the German vocabulary as well as the German syntax and intonation and word-order: *"Die Wortstellung ist beweglicher geworden."* It has become more flexible. The differences do not, however, remain any the less great. The many monosyllables and the great lack of feminine rhymes in English create real difficulties for the German translator, and the English, together with the American translator, must, in such cases,

try to get close to the German original by choosing monosyllables which sound like double syllables ("flower," "spire," etc.), as, for example, in the case of Marx-Morwitz's translations of Stefan George. Undoubtedly, as has already been mentioned, the German language is not only capable but also most desirous of adaptations.

Translating is a service to the word and it is also the conquest of the word. No slavish imitation can do justice to a poetical work of art. The translator himself must be master of the tongue, in rhythm, in rhyme-form, and in imagery, in which and through which he allows the symbolic contents of the work to be felt. On the one hand, he must sink completely into it and live in it, but on the other hand he must create something of his own in his own language, from which every trace of word-for-word translation or linguistic patchwork is wiped away, and in which the life of his own tongue lives. Formation of sentences, association, mental imagery, rhythm, etc., are forms of their own (not imitative borrowing), which are rooted in the mystery of every creation.

Novalis saw the whole world as a symbol: "The world is a universal tropus of the spirit, a symbolical picture of it." (*Fragmente*).

AUGUST CLOSS

FACES

They speak or slumber;
conceal a store of joy or sorrow;
or mirror thought of Hope's to-morrow:
they are the registers of worlds
beyond the spiral whirl of days,
wherein is woven destiny
as time with nature interplays.

WILLIAM EWART WALKER

The Universal Family

(A poem composed for the last Olympics in Mexico)

The Statement

Why so many nations
and so many beliefs,
when the source of it all
is the same One Supreme?

The function of the mind is to mind,
derived from the verb *Man*: to think;
Manu arose from the mind,
and his children became *Mānava*: men that belong
to Manu.

Manu is the first father of the world,
and children of the same father
are one and equal,
or are they not?

Why this difference of belief
this insistence on nationality
this race for superiority?
Why this all-binding net of suffering?

The people of the world share the same legend,
of common doom and common birth;
the story of the DELUGE and deliverance from it
is the same for all of us.

The saint Satyavrata
collecting together all the seeds of creation
set out in his tattered old boat
to cross the angry ocean, churned
by the fury of the deluge.

And the Supreme Lord himself
came to save his seeds from perishing.
This wondrous tale is well known.

The Hebrew Noah,
holy well-wisher of man,
with clear mind collected members
of his family and of all species,
and putting them on a wooden raft
floated down the rushing waters.
The Supreme One saved him too.

This common memory of our watery fate
is remembered and shared by us all.

Do we then need so many nations,
So many faiths, beliefs?

The ancient story of Adam and Eve
and their joint surrender to greed and lust,
is not unknown to us of Indian ancestry.
The echoes of Adam and Eve
are heard here too.
For "Adam" is another form of *Ātman*
and "Eve" a distant whisper of *Jīva*
whose eternal play
is described by the Vedic singer:
"Two birds of brilliant feather
twins and friends,
embrace the same stalk,
the one tastes the *pippala* fruit;
the other merely looks on,
and shines."

Ātman the lustrous one, is the eternal witness
whilst *Jīva* is the one who enjoys the world.

This is Truth all-embracing and eternal.
Why then such quibbling
such insistence on difference?

The same SUN shines over all nations,
the same MOON gladdens all hearts;
water, fire, earth, ether, air,
the elements are the same for us all.

Nature is not divided into creeds and philosophies.
Nature is indifferent to emotions,
transient smile or sorrow.
Life is one and the lord of life
is also one,
the elements are ruled by one single force.

The Universal religion is summed up in one word —
sacrifice,
this is happiness, this is Yoga, immortality!
The Veda says
"Through sacrifice they attained immortality."

The religion of man is equality and Yoga,
an absence of errors,
which amounts to equality with the Supreme,
a reaching for the supreme essence.

All the lores of the world
point to the eternal truth,
why then this cleavage into
caste and race,
why this division and disgrace?

Invocation to Mexico

The ancient *Makshikā* country,
the land which gives out gold and silver,
is modern Mexico,
and neighbouring Guatemala is
Gautamalaya,
the home of Gotama the sage.

Golden mines, truth and love
had made this land
a heaven upon earth.
To learn this you have to go
no farther than history.

Today in the vast playing-fields of this country,
men and women have gathered from all parts of the world,
tied with the strings of love
and yet playing together, competing.

For this was how the ancient Mexicans lived,
for them the Universe was one vast
nest, a refuge
which all could share.
Their hopes and prayers were,
"May we follow noble paths!"
and from the tops of Teotihuacan and Tajin
a thousand throats had repeated
"Construct the Universe with
the stuff that is Truth."

In those days there were not
so many differences,
and the world had less sorrow
and travail.

Men played, laughed, danced, loved and hunted
like children of one large family
and the earth-gods were Love and Sacrifice
and today our earth is divided
into so many nations
so many faiths!

Your games and your happy songs and dances
free of jealousy and hatred are roads to human welfare,
garlands of flowers of love and brotherhood,
invincible buttresses of the fort of living together!

The Hope

Like a tiger encased in cow's skin,
like a jar of poison smeared with milk,
are these men who call themselves
civilized.

Behind their glittering masks
they hide petty passions, jealousy,
enmity, vindicativeness,
love for power and pelf,
which makes them so determined
to kill other men.

Your noble ideals O Mexico!
"*Ofrecemos y deseamos amistad de todos*"
and "*Todo es possible en la paz*"
are exalted words.
May they bring peace to the inflamed passions
of these human tigers.

May they in loud voice declare —
"The whole world is one home,
all men are our own,
and together we play our appointed role
on the eternal stage of that
Universal Master of Ceremonies
Śiva, Natarāja."

So many faiths
So many beliefs
So many nations
are not in the plan
of God Almighty.

Sarve Bhavantu Sukhinaḥ
Sarve Santu Nirāmayāḥ
Sarve Bhadrāṇi Paśyantu
Mā Kaśchidduḥkhamāpanuyāt.
Om Shāntiḥ! Shāntiḥ! Shāntiḥ!

RAMAMURTI RENU
(Translated by KAMALA RATNAM)

True humility is not a virtue you can will yourself to practise: it is a state of mind, an expression of your whole personality. The truly humble man *lives* in every being; he knows the nature and virtue of each. Because everyone is as himself to him, he knows from within him that everyone has some hidden value, that everyone has his hour. Every soul stands bright and clear for him in the splendour of its own existence. He can condemn no one, for "he who judges another has judged himself."

To live with understanding of others is mere justice: to live *in* others, as in oneself, is love. And it is out of love that the humble help others, not out of pity: pity is but a sharp, quick pain that one wants to get rid of. The man who merely pities another is not suffering with him, is not carrying the other's sorrow in his own heart, as one might share in the life of a tree, in the dream of its roots and the desire of its trunk and the thousand movements of its boughs; or as one might share in the life of an animal, with its stretchings and clawings, and the joy of its sinews and limbs, and the dumb understanding of its brain. The man who only pities receives a sharp, quick pain from the mere outward manifestation of another's sorrow: a pain having nothing in common with the real sorrow of the sufferer.

The only help that exists in God's sight is the help that comes from living in others.

—MARTIN BUBER

SARALA DEVI

The Self-supporting Village Republic

[Shrimati Sarala Devi, not Indian by birth, has devoted herself for several years now to quiet, constructive social work under the inspiration of Vinobaji's *Bhū-dān* and Sarvodaya movement. In this article she points out the significance of the kind of self-supporting and self-sufficient village community which is the ideal of *Grām-dān*. She communicates some direct experience of the working of this movement together with its far-reaching implications.—ED.]

THE FISSION OF THE ATOM has faced the world with a challenge to reconstruct our whole social, economic, and political administration on a revolutionary scale. So far both orthodox and leftist economists have considered that revolution implies a change of ownership effected by violent or legal methods, but as a matter of fact, this is not true revolution, since it implies a mere change of ownership, but no change in the basic values of life, which still remain those of two milleniums of materialistic so-called progress.

Even before the fission of the atom, Mahatma Gandhi had realized with prophetic vision that the rapid developments of the age of science challenge us to equally rapid and revolutionary thinking in the fields of politics, economics, and social values. He was able to demonstrate the power of *Ahiṁsā* (non-violence, or constructively, love) by adopting the *takli* (spindle) and *charkhā* (spinning wheel) as the material weapons of his struggle against British imperialism, the moral weapon of which was self-sacrifice; thus proving that the values which have been the ethical basis of individual and family life can be effectively applied to public life also. This was revolution.

For the last fifteen years his disciple, Sant Vinoba Bhave, has been patiently but persistently demonstrating that after the attainment of *swarājya* these values can be effective in reconstruction in the social and economic fields, and that the challenge emerging from the fission of that minutest particle of matter, the atom, can and must be faced by fusing the smallest unit of social organization, the village, into a co-operative and self-sufficient family. His slogan of *"Hamara Mantra, Jai Jagat! Hamara Tantra, Garmdan!* (Our motto, Victory to the world! Our means, Village Gift!) implies an organization in which the self-sufficient village republic forms the direct unit of a world government.

The birth of the *Bhū-dān* (Land-gift) movement in 1951 was a natural upsurge of our Indian culture. For all his vast learning and concern, combined with his great faith in human nature, the possibility of the voluntary relinquishment of the ownership of land on a large scale had never

occurred to Sant Vinoba. A natural and simple response to his heartfelt expression of concern, in the form of the gift of one hundred acres of land for the landless of his village, by Ramachandra Reddi of Pochampalli (Andhra) on 18 April 1951 initiated the constructive stage of Mahatma Gandhi's conception of a non-violent revolution in the world order. So far, in the simple words of the Saint, revolutionists have looked with envy towards the ceiling; now they have to look with *karuṇā* (sympathy practically expressed) to the ground — in other words they have to look not to their rights as compared with those better off than themselves, but to their duty to those worse placed. He has revived the ancient tradition of *dān samavibhājanam* (charity means equal distribution) and this appeal is directed to all from the richest to the poorest. No-one is born so destitute that he has nothing to offer in the service of society — wealth, land, intelligence, education, physical strength, leisure. At present regarded as the means of personal satisfaction, these must now in the atomic age be used as a means of service to the community.

There has been a natural and spontaneous growth of this process. Through the *Bhū-dān* movement the ownership of about 450,000 acres of land was voluntarily relinquished. Owing to difficulties of legal formalities and official delays, so far about 200,000 acres of this land has been distributed to landless labourers who have now become self-supporting and self-respecting peasants. This may sound insignificant in view of the magnitude of the problem, but it has effected a change in the general attitude towards the possession of property which has paved the way for a wider scope. Moreover, considering that by the application of a nation-wide ceiling the government hoped to acquire a mere 1,000,000 acres (involving, incidentally, large-scale compensation and also the possibility of large-scale litigation combined with nepotism and deceit) but in practice could only realize 400,000 acres, it proves the possibilities of voluntary relinquishment as compared with legal enforcement.

The spirit of the movement has been increasingly applied to *sampatti-dān* (gifts of capital), *shrama-dān* (gifts of labour), *samaya-dān* (gifts of time), and ultimately has developed into *grāma-dān* (gift of a village). This last, briefly stated, involves the communal ownership of all the village land by a *grām-sabhā* (village assembly), whilst the hereditary rights of cultivation rest with the hereditary owning family. Rights of sale of land are, however, restricted to the *grām-sabhā* and in any case, even with their permission, land may be transferred only to a member of the *grām-sabhā* or to the *grām-sabhā* itself. The newly constructed *grām-sabhā* consists of one adult member from every constituent family, and its decisions are by unanimity or consensus, not by vote, which implies majority rule. This will remove one of the main causes of the political

and social friction in our villages, engendered by the introduction of the political party system into the body politic from *pancāyat* to parliament.

In order to create a bond of unity and mutual co-operation, landowners will donate one twentieth of their land to the landless of the village. At harvest time, peasants will donate one fortieth of their produce to form a *grām-kośa* (village fund). Salaried members will devote one day's earning per month; and the labouring classes one day's labour per month or twelve days' labour per year. This *grām-kośa* will be used as capital for purposes of village development, the basis of which will be the foundation of village industries to provide full employment for the labouring classes, thus giving a practical form to Mahatma Gandhi's conception of village self-sufficiency. This implies the processing within the village of the raw materials produced therein, and the consumption of these finished products in the village itself.

The *grām-sabhā* will also function as a multi-purpose co-operative society and will plan the agricultural production of the village with a view to achieving self-sufficiency. From the marketing point of view it will also plan to stock the annual requirements of grain for the whole village, retaining the surplus for future emergencies or disposing of it by sale, as circumstances may require. Vinobaji's idea that a successful Gandhian village should have in stock sufficient grain to supply two years' demand was demonstrated by some *grām-dān* villages in the famine area of Bihar last year, which in spite of the complete failure of the *kharif* (rainy-season) crop had nothing to fear from famine, and had decided that as long as a single grain of corn remained, they would share it equally. When or if the question of starvation arose, it would be a case for all, not merely for the poor or the landless.

The *grām-sabhā* will further function as a co-operative bank supplying loans to its members on reasonable terms, thus eliminating one of the main causes of alienation of land, and will undertake the responsibility of caring for the sick, the aged, the unemployed, and the widowed.

The communal ownership of land, combined with the settlement of all disputes voluntarily within the village, removes one of the main drains on village economies, litigation and corruption, today so unfortunately associated on a large scale with official interference in village affairs. The programme of planning for economic self-sufficiency removes the main source of exploitation by the *bazaar* (market), as a result of which both producers and consumers are exploited by the middleman on the principle of supply and demand. The village bank will eliminate exploitation by moneylenders.

All this is on the material side. But on the moral and spiritual side, this conception of the society working towards self-sufficiency on the basis

of voluntary relinquishment of a portion of property and rights is significant. It changes the whole system of values prevalent in our materialistic society, based on the pre-eminence of capital, land, or power over human labour, and involving competition and majority rule. It sets up instead the ancient values of Indian culture.

The conception of *grām-dān* has now been extended to block-*dān* (a "block" is the government unit of rural development) and thence to *zila* (district)-*dān*.

The first to declare *zila-dān* has been the district of Darbhanga in Bihar. This district, the area covered by the ancient kingdom of Mithila, the traditional kingdom of *Brahma Vidyā* (Divine Wisdom) of King Janaka, is one of the largest and most thickly populated districts of India, with an average of only one-third acre of cultivated land per head of the population. This insufficiency is aggravated still further by the fact that much of the land is still owned by large landowners and cultivated by more or less half-starving landless labourers. This district thus presents in a nutshell all the problems of under-employment, semi-starvation, and exploitation which have to be solved in the villages of free India. Yet at the same time there is real fidelity to the ancient spiritual traditions and an emotional basis which augurs well for the success of this movement when the practical application of these in the present context is understood.

However, the relics of the tradition of *Brahma Vidyā* amongst the educated classes are combined with some forms of most ruthless and heartless exploitation Amongst the labourers there is a strange combination of submission to *karma* combined with a rapidly growing fierce discontent and resentment instilled by communists. There is also a large body of partly or fully self-supporting farmers who are mostly conservative and somewhat self-centred, but whose shrewd common sense quickly apprehends the material possibilities of this movement. The women are in strict *purdah,* but one feels in them a simplicity and sympathy which could be a great asset in the constructive work of co-operation to be undertaken under the new plan.

For the last thirty years or more *khādi* (hand-spinning-and-weaving) institutions have done much to alleviate rural unemployment through the *charkhā* (spinning wheel) and the loom. Therefore the poor have had full faith in these institutions and this faith was one of the main factors in facilitating the signature campaign. But owing to piled-up stocks of *khādi* in which their capital is locked up, these institutions have no alternative but to pay their spinners in the form of expensive and city-oriented *khādi,* not the strong, plain, cheaper sort which is their real need. They frequently dispose of this *khādi* to the public at ridiculously low rates. This has given rise to a considerable amount of distrust and

discontent and faces the *grām-sabhās* which will shortly be constituted with the first pressing problem of the training of weavers and the purchase and supply of fleece for spinning.

In this atmosphere, the colossal task of reconstruction on the initiative of the villagers as contrasted to relief in the form of labour by institutions has to be taken up on a large scale. This calls for a revolutionary change in the workers' attitude. Whereas in the past the *kāryakartās* (public workers) have become a separate managerial class, for the future we have to plan a society in which the ordinary citizen is also a public worker and the public worker is also an ordinary citizen. The institutions must come under the management of the new *grām-sabhās.*

The first step is confirmation of *grām-dān,* the initiation of the new *grām-sabhā,* and the distribution of one twentieth of the land. It is being found that during this process of confirmation, some people who had refused to join at the time of the signature-collection campaign decide to join the newly constituted village family.

An attempt is being made on a very primitive scale to recruit, at the village level, women who can undertake propaganda for and effect some kind of simple get-togethers amongst the women. It must be a process of selection from below upwards, for how can we hope that girls educated in our present schools and colleges will be ready to work under the primitive conditions of the villages?

An appeal has also been made to experienced workers all over India to "adopt" a development block (of which there are forty-four in the district) or a sub-division town (three) and give three months of their time at intervals in the year to discussing, assessing, and planning with the village-level leaders.

A method of approach to the town also has to be evolved. A beginning is to be made by organizing a Tarun Shanti Sena (Youth Peace Corps) in the schools and colleges. Much thought is being devoted to the concept of *nagar-dān* (town-gift) which must be developed if we are to evolve a new society in which village and town merge into a co-operative unit, instead of the present constitution, in which the villages are subjected to exploitation by the towns.

In the twentieth century this ideal of a new society based on self-sacrifice and mutual concern on a large scale presents the challenge of true adventure to socially-minded youth (more especially to women), and to our orthodox specialists a call to revolutionary thinking and experiment in economic, political, and social sciences as well as in the productive field.

It seems that in terms of larger units this principle of co-operative regional self-sufficiency may offer the possibility of a solution of the

economic problems facing the world as a result of the political freedom of the nations of Africa and Asia, and lead towards a peaceful (non-violent) organization of national and international life with the hope of eliminating sources of international friction. Thus the extension of the principle of non-violence applied to national problems, initiated by Mahatma Gandhi through the *takli* and the *charkha,* holds out the possibility of the creation of a peaceful organization of society based on the principles of mutual concern and sacrifice, which alone can diminish conflict in an age in which conflict may result in *pralaya* (total destruction).

The harvest is ready, but the labourers are few. What is called for is sincere study, help, and co-operation from workers in all fields who feel the urgency of the practical application of spiritual values in the daily life of the world in all spheres of individual, national, and international relations.

SARALA DEVI

Nor will reverence for life grant me my happiness as my own. At the moments when I should like to enjoy myself without restraint, it wakes in me reflection about misery that I see or suspect, and it does not allow me to drive away the uneasiness thereby caused to me. Just as the wave cannot exist for itself, but is ever a part of the heaving surface of ocean, so must I never live my life for itself, but always in the experience which is going on around me. It is an uncomfortable doctrine which the true ethic whispers into my ear. You are happy, it says; therefore you are called upon to give much. Whatever more than others you have received in health, natural gifts, working capacity, success, a beautiful childhood, harmonious family circumstances, you must not accept as being a matter of course. You must pay a price for them. You must show more than average devotion of life to life.

—ALBERT SCHWEITZER

New Books and Old

"The Hindu Family in Its Urban Setting"*

THE ACADEMIC INTEREST in Hindu society is no longer merely a matter of curiosity about the unfamiliar. It is an aspect of the contemporary concern with "social change" — the world-wide phenomenon of a pressure upon social structures to adapt to the rapid advances in science and technology and to their increasing application to the different areas of life, as seen in the processes of "urbanization," "industrialization," and "modernization." Western social scientists turn to India as a country which is right in the midst of the transition from tradition to modernity, a country in which urbanization and industrialization are so recent that such changes in the social structure as are necessary for the adaptation to these processes are barely emerging, and therefore a country in which change can be readily observed — caught — even as it comes on. Nowhere perhaps could be explosive pressures of a rapid adaptation to change be better observed than in the encounter between the Hindu family, a stronghold of tradition, and the forces of modernization. It is precisely this aspect of social change in India that Aileen Ross undertakes to explore in *The Hindu Family in Its Urban Setting*.

For the individual, urban life means a departure from tradition in many directions. It offers mobility, both vertical and horizontal. It offers endless opportunities in education and in occupation, and contacts with varied cultures. Above all, by accepting achievement, rather than ascription, as the basis of social status and by providing services of many kinds it liberates the individual from his dependence on the family. In modern and modernizing societies the independence of the individual is accentuated by the value set on a high level of individuation and by a belief in the equality of the sexes. What are the consequences of this to the traditional joint or extended Hindu family which is based on proximity of residence of relatives, on inheritance of occupation, on a denial and supersession of the individual in favour of the family, and on an unquestioned acceptance of male superiority? To answer the question Miss Ross first neatly sorts out the different aspects of family life. Then with reference to each of these aspects, she indicates with painstaking thoroughness the manner in which norms, patterns of behaviour, and, in the ultimate analysis, interpersonal relationships within the family are likely to be affected by urbanization and modernization in India.

The aspect or sub-structures of the family that Miss Ross takes into consideration are as follows — the ecological sub-structure consisting of the spatial and geographical arrangements of members and households; the sub-structure of power and authority; the sub-structure of rights and duties; the sub-structure of obligations and sentiments; and the sub-structure of alliances — viz., friendship and marriage patterns. The relationships covered by her analysis include all possible sets of relationships within a joint family in India. Her analysis is mainly conceptual. Using "impressions" made in the course of interviews with "informants" and using all kinds of library material such as sacred texts, ancient law-books, folk songs, novels, and biographies, she draws up a picture of the traditional Hindu family. She then indicates the manner in which urbanization and modernization are likely to affect each of the sub-structures of this traditional

* *The Hindu Family in Its Urban Setting*. By AILEEN D. ROSS. (University of Toronto Press Canada. 325 pp. Reprinted 1967. Paperback, $2.25)

Hindu family. Finally, she spells out her expectations regarding the points at which the pressures to change are likely to make for tensions and conflicts.

This is not strictly an empirical study. But it marks a significant departure from the conventional conceptual analysis because the author illustrates her points with empirical data obtained in the course of 157 intensive interviews undertaken in Bangalore and Bombay.

Miss Ross is sensitive, perceptive, and thorough — the result is that a study which purports to be nothing more than an effort to identify the strains and conflicts that face the traditional Hindu family in an urban setting ends up by turning out to be a vivid picture of the Hindu family in tradition and in change. To the layman, the study offers valuable insights into the structure of the Hindu family and into the conflicts involved in the pressures to change. To the social scientist it offers a wealth of viewpoints, a storehouse of valuable hypotheses that could fruitfully be tested.

Quite apart from the merits of its substantive contents, this study is valuable on two counts: first because of its use of empirical data; secondly because it offers a model for the analysis of change in a specific sub-structure of society. In order to appreciate the importance of the first factor it is necessary to recognize the dearth of empirical data in this particular area of social research. In analysing social change, social scientists have mainly concentrated on conceptual analyses. This preoccupation with conceptual analysis is partly a consequence of the fact that well-defined concepts are badly needed in this area of social research. Even basic concepts like "modernization" and "urbanization" have yet to be satisfactorily defined. But it is also a consequence of the fact that empirical research on social change calls for intensive studies, rather than sample surveys. It is difficult to organize intensive studies on a large scale and to obtain empirical data representative enough for generalization. Miss Ross, faced with exactly the same difficulty, is unable to obtain data on a sample representative of the country. But she indicates the manner in which empirical data may at least be used to lend weight to statement of "expectations" regarding the consequences of change, which otherwise would be purely conceptual in character. Similarly, Miss Ross's concentration on a single aspect of the social structure is welcome. There has been a tendency to discuss change generally rather than to analyse change in specific sub-structures of society, with the result that few models are available to guide research in the specific aspects of social change. In offering a model for the analysis of change within the family system in society, Miss Ross has made a valuable contribution to sociology.

SUMA CHITNIS

The Buddhist Way of Life. By CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS. (Published for the Buddhist Society by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 224 pp. 1969. 40*s*.)

Mr. Christmas Humphreys, the well-known Western Buddhist, has achieved a masterpiece in this latest of his many works. By a brilliant combination of easy prose and profound poetry he makes Buddhism clear for all.

If many in the West today cannot accept Jesus as their guide, because ages of ignorance have obscured his teaching for them, that same teaching (for all the Masters teach the one essential truth) is presented here in a way that defies honest rejection, a way that speaks to the modern mind and answers modern criticism of doctrines that may seem worn-out and misleading.

So many self-styled atheists are permanently red in the face with anger at "a God who can permit all this," when their indignation is, in fact, directed at a god they have constructed for themselves so pathetically stupid that, of

course, it cannot work.

There is no such problem in the Buddhist way. Suffering is not used as an excuse for disbelief. Suffering is accepted as the result of a man's own previous error. No-one else can be blamed for it. It is his fault alone and the only guide that can lead him out of it. Man's field is eternity and man's power over his own destiny decisive. He has life after life, all springing from his own freely chosen actions in the past, to learn from his mistakes and choose at last the way to freedom from the bondage he himself creates. God is not denied, but It is a conception so limitless as to be beyond naming or even profitable discussion. The WAY is the thing — the way a man must go, must indeed BECOME, if he would ever win through to the experience of Ultimate Reality, which alone is freedom.

The Buddhist Way of Life is a challenge to all who have dismissed religious belief as escapism. It denies all possibility of escape. It demands we move through life's problems, but it arms us with principles, well tested, that will guide us on to their end.

D. S. MAXTED

The Heart of Buddhist Meditation: Satipaṭṭhāna: A Handbook of Mental Training Based on the Buddha's Way of Mindfulness. With an Anthology of Relevant Texts translated from the Pali and Sanskrit. By NYANAPONIKA THERA. (Rider and Company, London. 223 pp. 1969. Paperback, 21*s*.); *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism: According to the Esoteric Teachings of the Great Mantra* OM MANI PADME HUM. By LAMA ANAGARIKA GOVINDA (Anangavajra Khamsum-Wangchuk). (Rider and Company, London. 309 pp. Photographic Plates by LI GOTAMI. Brush drawings and line diagrams. 1969. Paperback, 25*s*.)

The publishers have done well in reprinting these two books as paperbacks — and superior paperbacks at that, with pleasing design, fine paper and print, and good reproduction of the photographs, drawings, symbols, and seed-syllables of Tibetan Buddhism.

The Heart of Buddhist Meditation is based mainly on the Pali Canon of the Theravada school. Its subject is the "Way of Mindfulness (*Satipaṭṭāna*) considered as practical for everyday life as for the highest spiritual one. The basic text is the *Mahā-satipaṭṭhāna-Sutta* from the *Dīgha-Nikāya*. There is also an explanatory section and an anthology of supplementary texts. Indeed, when men swing between the wandering "mindless" mind and the obsessed, fanatic mind, these teachings on right mindfulness are much needed.

The *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism* has a more occult tone. It combines a sense of universality with an almost overwhelmingly detailed description of the cosmic hierarchies and powers, as of man's own psychological aspects, and provides food for thought for a lifetime. By a German-born Lama, it is the fruit of over twenty years' experi ence in Tibetan Buddhist hermitages and monasteries, with the Bodhisattva ideal of his own Guru's life before him. He claims that the true Buddhist Tantra Yoga in its symbolism of polarity represents the female principle as *Prajña* (wisdom), never as *Śakti* (force), as in the popular tantric worship of Śāktism with "its world-creating eroticism." The chapters on the Three Vestures, including that on "The Nirmāṇakāya as the Highest Form of Realization," are of particular interest.

The Preface, written 1956, refers to storms ahead when Tibet (storehouse of the ancient mystery-tradition) would lose its isolation. The author's Guru, Tomo Gésché Rimpoché, foreseeing this, had left his remote hermitage, since the time had come to make known Tibet's hitherto unknown treasures of Truth. Humanity was at the cross-roads between the Path of Power over nature, leading to self-destruction, and the Path of Enlightenment, through control of its own forces, leading to Freedom and Self-Realization, and finally to self-

sacrifice for the sake of the world — the goal of the Bodhisattva Path. The book is thus written for the discerning few.

E. DRURY

Śaṁkara and Bradley. By S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA. (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. iv+272 pp. 1968. Rs. 25.00)

The work is an attempt to compare and contrast the Absolutism of Bradley with the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṃkara. From similar attempts in histories of Indian philosophy and articles in periodicals we already know that in the thinking of both Śaṁkara and Bradley we meet with "an extreme monism with its distinctions of logic and intuition, reality and the world of existence"; both seem to accept that the real is changeless, but, unlike Bradley, Śaṁkara makes "no contrast between the mental construction and the present fact."

This is perhaps the first time when a systematic and comprehensive study of the subject has been made, based on a close and critical scrutiny of the works of both these thinkers. Chapter I discusses the role of reason in the philosophies of both Śaṁkara and Bradley; both give reasoning its due importance but are also aware that it is unable to grasp ultimate Reality, to which only a non-relational immediate experience can possibly be adequate. But while for Śaṁkara "this experience is a possibility," to Bradley it is "a mere *focus imaginarius*, ideally conceivable but never actually attainable by man." The next three Chapters (II–IV) are concerned with the problem of the Self and the Absolute as understood by both these thinkers. It is indicated that Śaṁkara's "conception of the Ātman as foundational and trans-empirical Knowledge or Consciousness fully meets Bradley's demands for continuity and self-sameness as the essential criteria of selfhood." Śaṁkara's doctrine of the two orders of experience, the relative (*vyāvahārika*) and the Absolute (*pāramārthika*), we are told, offers "a more satisfactory solution of the problem of reconciling the Absolute with its appearances than the one offered by Bradley." That the external world is, to Śaṁkara, "not the perception of vacuum or an illusion or a hallucination, but the experience of the Absolute Reality itself as it appears to our finite human experience," is the import of Chapter V. We are told in the next Chapter (VI) that, contrary to Śaṁkara who gives God (*Īśvara*) the "unique cosmic significance" of the "Supreme Ruler and Controller of the Universe," Bradley declares that "the God of religion is an appearance and in the Absolute, God and religion are equally lost." The Transcendence of Good and Evil and Super-morality, the status of the waking world, immediate experience, non-contradiction as the criterion of reality, *māyā*, and the criticism of relational understanding are discussed in Chapters VII to XII. The author is at pains to find parallels in Bradley's writings for Śaṁkara's *Māyā* theory. It is difficult to agree with him when he feels that Śaṁkara has understood the word *only* in the traditional sense (p. 9). The word occurs even in the *Ṛgveda*; derived from the root *mā*, "to measure," it means there only a "supernatural power." It is Śaṁkara that has given the word his *own* special meaning in his philosophy. Assessing Śaṁkara's philosophy in the context of contemporary thought in the last Chapter (XIII), the author tells us that *Māyā*, understood in its true philosophic sense of an "all-pervasive relativism," is "present in principle in contemporary Western philosophic speculation as well as in the most recent scientific thought." (p. 9)

The book is valuable to students of Comparative Philosophy in general and Advaita Vedānta in particular.

There are many misprints, in both the English and the Sanskrit portion, which are not noted in the Errata (for instance, pp. 11, 12, 53). These could have been avoided by more careful proof-reading.

H. G. NARAHARI

Christian and Hindu Ethics. By SHIVESH CHANDRA THAKUR. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 216 pp. 1969. 48*s*.)

It is to be hoped that the days of merely polemical comparisons are over and also of treatments in parallel designed to prove that in the end all religions are the same. That we are in a new era of comparative study has welcome evidence in this erudite, tolerant, and beautifully written book of Dr. Thakur. It may be said, superficially at least, that the choice of subject enables him to bat on an easier wicket but that in no way detracts from the skill of the performance.

He begins, in few but sufficient pages, to clear away the detritus of the past and to frame his terms of reference in the context of the world as it now is and giving due place to the fact that ethics (not necessarily to be equated with morality) does not exist *in vacuo* but always in a religious continuum. Ethics is, in short, the system of philosophical thought on moral problems which guides communities knit together by their respective fundamental beliefs.

On this basis Dr. Thakur selects certain fundamental questions as to, e.g., man's nature and destiny; the moral law in respect of authority sources and content; moral effort and failure; freedom and responsibility, in order to see what answers are given by Hinduism and Christianity, and so to proceed to compare and contrast these answers. As might be expected the analysis and description is shrewd, competent, and objective. Whether the same success can be ascribed to the synthesis itself is open to question. Dr. Thakur refuses even to attempt to establish or reject the alleged superiority of either of the two systems in respect of the other. In this he is wiser than many of his predecessors. Yet he does not deny himself the privilege of making a modest hypothesis, viz., that for all the metaphysical and theological differences between the two religions the gap is much narrower in regard to the ethical implications. The conclusion maintains the validity of the hypothesis and adduces arguments which are relevant and which suggest that Dr. Thakur has been at pains to support his wide reading with existential knowledge of the persons, communities, and practices involved, as for example in his perceptive comment that the contemporary Christian concern to restore the unity of the churches is not basically different from the efforts of Hindus to abolish the caste distinctions to which the original institution of *Varṇa* has degenerated.

We think that the objective evidence so well marshalled in the body of this book may well become the basis of further attempts to examine and test the reconciling hypotheses with which it so engagingly concludes. Meanwhile the universities of India and of Britain may rejoice to have nurtured so promising a scholar.

MARCUS WARD

On Science, Necessity, and the Love of God. By SIMONE WEIL. Ed. by RICHARD REES. (Oxford University Press, London. 201 pp. 1968. 42*s*.)

Simone Weil died at the early age of thirty-four in 1943, at the height of the miseries and humiliation of the Occupation of France during the Second World War. She worked for the Free French Government in London, and produced among other writings a Memorandum on French Morals and Psychology. Although a rigid determinist in psychology, she was neither fatalistic nor resigned. She had swiftly gone through the phases of political and economic liberalism, and had come up against the mystical nature of her being with a crushing impact. She has been described as "a soul at the edge of flight," often in that wondrous daze which implies the presence of God. T. S. Eliot, who wrote a Preface to the English translation of one of her best-known books, *The Need for Roots*, said of her, "We must simply expose ourselves to the personality of a woman of genius, of a kind of genius akin to that of the saints."

The present work shows up an unfamiliar aspect of her intellectual make-up: her deep knowledge of science and its history and its present trends. It is a series of essays selected by Sir Richard Rees, who has edited previously another selection of general essays, of her letters, and also a sketch for her biography. The essays got together here, as well as some letters addressed to her brother, Professor André Weil, one of the most eminent among living mathematicians, comprise all that she ever wrote in this direction. Her editor rightly says,

> She did not get much beyond the preliminary spadework of clearing the ground, but by doing that much she did what only a small number of thinkers today possess the qualifications for and what those few seem reluctant to do.

The book is in two parts, the theme of both of which may be considered mystical — a conception of human destiny which is first approached from the scientific point of view and then from a religious and philosophical angle. Simone Weil believed that, with the turn of the century, a crisis had developed in science, particularly in physics, the philosophic consequence of which was the loss of "the idea of truth." This she attributes principally to the philosophical implications of the Quantum hypothesis and the theory of Relativity. Her contention is that the idea of "necessity" which was the foundation of classical science provided "the material common to art, science, and every kind of labour," and is "the door by which Christianity can enter profane life and permeate the whole of it." She believes with intensity that science cannot long survive unless it embodies some conception of human destiny.

It must be said that the thesis itself is controversial. No doubt recent physics has dealt the death-blow to the deterministic idea of truth built up by science so far and to the notion of human destiny consecrated by centuries of Christianity. The new principle of "indeterminacy" may well lead to a wider conception of truth, ushered in by more comprehensive views of space and time. Besides, there is no choice in the matter, however much it may repel the innate conservatism of Simone Weil's outlook. This, however, need not detract from the value of the book, which, although far from easy reading, is pervaded by high seriousness and abounds in critical insights, of which the following, bearing on the present topic, but taken from another piece of writing, is a good sample:

> One could count on one's fingers the number of scientists in the entire world who have a general idea of the history and development of their own particular science; there is not one who is really competent as regards sciences other than his own. As science forms an indivisible whole, one may say that there are no longer, strictly speaking, any scientists, but only drudges doing scientific work. ...

K. GURU DUTT

Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics. By K. KRISHNAMOORTHY. (Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore. 352 pp. 1968. Rs. 30.00; 42*s*.; $7.50)

Literary criticism in India is a highly developed discipline, and among the hundreds of excellent treatises in Sanskrit dealing with this subject, Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* is perhaps the most celebrated. His theory of *dhvani* has made a profound impact on the aesthetic speculations of Indians since the ninth century; its influence is to be seen not only in the works of its exponents but in those of its critics as well.

Dr. Krishnamoorthy of the Karnatak University is well known for his studies in the field of literary criticism in Sanskrit. He belongs to the class of mature, erudite, and cautious scholars, in company with Professors M. Hiriyanna, Kuppuswami Sastri, S. K. De, and V. Raghavan. This volume, his doctoral thesis, is a monument to his scholarship and fine critical faculty. It has received high praise from the Bombay University referees, who described it as "a

fairly thorough, critical, and systematic exposition of a difficult and highly important text in almost all its aspects and bearings."

The elaborate Introduction is also an excellent summary of the development of aesthetic speculations in India; he ably discusses the poetics of Bhāmaha (pp. 9–14) and Daṇḍin (p. 14ff) and shows how they paved the way for *dhvani*. The second chapter, which deals with the genesis of the *dhvani* theory, is very readable; it shows how the theory was much older than Ānandavardhana, and what prompted Ānandavardhana, attempt to elaborate and perfect the theory.

The bulk of the book is devoted to the exposition of *dhvani*, especially in relation to *guṇavṛtti* (p. 129ff), to *alaṅkāra* in general, to *rasa*, to *guṇa*, to *rīti*, and to *vṛtti* (Section II of Chapter IV). This discussion is rounded off with a "critical estimate," which is a creative review of the theory. The latter part of the book deals with critics of the *dhvani* theory like Manoratha, Bhaṭṭanāyaka (p. 234ff), Pratihāra Indurāja, and others. One wonders whether the author's inclusion of Kuntaka in the group of critics is not rather unjustified. Kuntaka did not reject the *dhvani* theory, as Bhaṭṭanāyaka did; but he offered *vakrokti* as a better theory, as more inclusive. *Vakrokti* includes *dhvani*. In concluding the work, the author has made a comparative estimate of Western theorists of literary criticism like Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, T. S. Eliot, and Abercrombie.

The book is by all standards an excellent one; it is comprehensive in its scope and critical in its approach. It shows that *Dhvanyāloka* holds the key to the history of Sanskrit poetics; it is not without ample justification that Dr. Krishnamoorthy has taken up this work for analysis and evaluation, and he has done sufficient justice to it. He is to be warmly congratulated on this fine publication.

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Golden Jubilee Volume. (Poona. 465pp. 1968.)

The Golden Jubilee Volume of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute is intended to be a commemorative record of valuable research in Oriental studies in the last fifty years. It attains this objective admirably.

It contains fifty-two research articles on a variety of subjects, ranging from literature to sports and horses, by eminent research scholars of the day. It comprises the fruits of patient research, as is evident from the large number of references given by every research scholar to substantiate his findings.

Some of the most outstanding articles, which furnish us with unexpected facts, are: "Problems in the Text-Critical Reconstruction of the Ṛgveda Palimpsest" by A. Esteller; "A Note on *Anuśāsanaparvan*" by Vittore Pisani; "The *Kuvalayamalakatha* of Ratnaprabhāsūri" by A. N. Upadhye; "The Historical Background of the name Satya assigned to the Highest Being" by J. Gonda; "*Alaṅkārasudhānidhi*, Attributed to Sāyana, a Hitherto Unpublished Treatise in Sanskrit Poetics" by (Kumari) D. C. Sarasvati; "The Doctrine of the Colours of Souls in the *Mahābhārata*: Its Characteristics and Implications" by V. M. Bedekar; "The Status of Skandagupta's Mother" by Jagannath Agarwal; "A Note on the Śātavāhanas" by Sudhakar Chattopadhyaya; "New Light on the Life of Panditaraja Jagannatha" by R. B. Athavale; "The *Śukānuśāsana* (*Śukānupraśna*)" by V. Raghavan; "The Mystery of the *Yajñaphalam*" by A. D. Pusalker.

Some articles enlighten us on linguistic details: "Pāṇini and Ṛgvedic Exegesis" by G. V. Devasthali; "A Socio-Semantic Analysis of Sanskrit 'Kalp'" by O. H. de Wijesekera; "Vedic Quotations in the *Kāśikā* and *Siddhāntakaumudī*" by Ram Gopal; "A Note on the Language of the *Yoga-Vāsistha*" by Satyavrat; "Middle Persian Word for Sanskrit *Mauna*" by M. F. Kanga.

Some articles present historical facts

to us: "Stone Yupa Ascribed to Nṛga" by B. Ch. Chhabra; "Early Literary History of the Buddhist, especially the Guhyasamaja, Tantra" by Alex Wayman.

Besides these there are articles of philosophical interest such as: "Bhaskara, the Vedantin, in Buddhist Literature" by R. Morton Smith; "Gaudapada and Sankara (A Study in Contrast)" by A. G. Krishna Warrier; "Reality as Viewed in the Trika System of Philosophy" by G. Mukhopadhyaya; "The Concept of Videha and Prakṛti Laya in the Sānkhya-Yoga System" by S. Bhattacharya; "The Problem of the Pratyayasarga in Sankhya and Its Relation to Yoga" by C. T. Kenghe; "God in Hindu Thought" by R. N. Dandekar.

Last, but not least, there are a few articles which indicate the cultural and historical development of India, e.g.: "Irrigation and Agricultural Economy in Ancient India" by B. N. Puri; "Hunting in India under the Early Turks" by S. H. Askari; "Fighting against Despots in Old Indian Literature" by H. Nakamura; "Arab Horses in India" by Devisingh Chauhan; "A Forgotten Episode in the Medieval History of Bengal" by R. C. Majumdar; "Location of the Hermitage of Agastya in the Deccan" by V. V. Mirashi; "Jain Monuments of India' by B. J. Sandesara.

These research articles cater to all tastes and aptitudes. Though the dignity of the research article is maintained, the volume provides materials, adequately, for both serious and light reading. The articles would widen any young research scholar's sphere of thought and increase his mental calibre.

Therefore the book is a veritable treasure-house. As one reads the articles in succession, one feels the renewed interest and pleasure that one feels when passing from one painting to another in an art gallery. It is a lasting contribution to social good and will be an incentive to intellectual seeking for generations to come.

SHAKUNTALA N. GAYATONDE

The man who is contented to be only himself, and therefore less a self, is in prison. My own eyes are not enough for me, I will see through those of others. Reality, even seen through the eyes of many, is not enough. I will see what others have invented. Even the eyes of all humanity are not enough. I regret that the brutes cannot write books. Very gladly would I learn what face things present to a mouse or a bee; more gladly still would I perceive the olfactory world charged with all the information and emotion it carries for a dog.

Literary experience heals the wound, without undermining the privilege, of individuality. There are mass emotions which heal the wound; but they destroy the privilege. In them our separate selves are pooled and we sink back into sub-individuality. But in reading great literature I become a thousand men and yet remain myself. Like the night sky in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad eyes, but it is still I who see. Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more myself than when I do.

—C. S. LEWIS

Correspondence

A Letter from Manchester

MANKIND TODAY faces a crisis of global dimensions. Men of different races draw apart, emphasizing their differences, seemingly ignoring those things which belong to their peace and wholeness as a human family. Material levels also divide. Luxury among the have-nations contrasts starkly with deprivation among many peoples of the older civilizations and ex-colonized areas. Everywhere, science proliferates gadgets, yet at the same time has serious consequences, eroding religion, questioning man's transcendental dimension, and threatening his future on the planet. Technology seems to have run away into triviality or malevolence. Yet never was there a greater awareness of mankind's ills, never greater yearning, especially among the young, for a profound change in man's direction.

Accordingly, it was fitting that the international congress called every decade by the British organization of the Student Christian Movement should have taken "Response to Crisis" as the theme of the 1969 gathering held at Britain's major northern city, Manchester. This metropolis has its own history of turbulence: the Peterloo Massacre and the founding of the Trades Union Congress were highlights of British radicalism in the last century in a city which waxed fat on the exploitation of workers at home and overseas, particularly, of course, in India. So Manchester was a fitting rendezvous for a 1,500-strong student congress concerned about race conflict and world poverty. Many students came from outside Britain; indeed thirty-two countries were represented, ranging from Japan to Czechoslovakia, and India to the United States. A world youth forum was established in Manchester for that historic April week.

World traveller, interpreter of current historical trends, and exiled South African, Ronald Segal argued that "Western civilization is sick unto dying" because of its preoccupation with the "morality of force and profit." Europe's domination of the globe for four centuries had ended politically, but the racial arrogance of the White man and the degradation of the non-White still persisted in many place and many hearts. The "Third World" needed to complete its break with its enslaving past, and in so doing would bring spiritual release to Western man himself. Mankind as a whole needed to be rehabilitated. New movements of spiritual regeneration had to free man "from the civilization of things, not of persons" from the meaninglessness of preoccupation with money, and from the violence which characterized so many of the relations between man and man today.

Mr. Segal is a secular humanist who respects such religious people as the Quakers: his call for "the struggle for human dignity" was warmly applauded by the assembled students.

Archbishop Helder Camara, Roman Catholic prelate of Olinda and Recife in northern Brazil, is a very different kind of man — saintly, living among the poor of his nation, gentle in spirit but given to wrathful speaking against systems of government or business which keep people in under-nourishment, illiteracy, and hopelessness. He specified the "Seven Deadly Sins of the Modern World" as racism, colonialism, war, paternalism, pharisaism, estrangement and fear, all of which young people were repudiating. Camara's appeal to the youth of the world from Manchester must re-echo across the globe:

> You must create a multi-racial world, in which different races respect one another, associate and mingle as brothers. You must change fundamentally the pattern of international trade, eliminate neo-colonialism and promote the development of all mankind. You must make war on war, so that we may real-

ize that great appeal of Pope VI: "No more war. Never again war." You must overcome paternalism, which denies rights, especially the greatest right of all, that of "conscientisacao," the awakening of conscience. You must eradicate pharisaism among individuals, families, national and international; you must prevent estrangement, especially in the universities. You must be afraid of only one thing, the fear of being afraid.

Significantly, Camara as a Roman Catholic, various Protestant speakers, secularists and humanists from the West, Hindus, Muslims, and others from the Third World, all stressed the need for a common human and spiritual response by men of all major religions and philosophies of the world to mankind's current malaise of body and soul.

A major Christian thinker of recent years has been the Dutchman, Dr. W. A. Visser't Hooft, until recently the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches. His call to the Manchester Congress was a thoughtful Christian contribution to that spiritual response. He insisted that the kingdom of God was "not a castle in the air, but the salt of the earth, not another world but a great ferment in history." The universality of the divine kingdom meant that no man who took its claims seriously could any longer think of his own nation or his ideology, as any absolute or final value. Hatred could have no place in the renewal of mankind.

In our time, great battles have to be fought against oppressive structures of society, against conscious and unconscious racism and against international injustice: but protest must be a first word but not a last word. Minds set on the Kingdom of God must be concerned that inevitable human conflict does not lead to mutual destruction. They must bring the newness of forgiveness into the old world of enmity and hatred.

The contemporary automatic and ultimately self-destructive processes of social and political disorder could only be overcome as people overcome these processes within themselves.

Congresses of the young do not change the world overnight; but assemblies of such dedicated young people from across the globe as met at Manchester in the spring of 1969 have the potential so to do. No-one could doubt their aspiration for a better world, their hope and their vision. History alone will testify to their commitment.

BRIAN G. COOPER

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

The Religious Experience Research Unit, to be established at Manchester College, Oxford, was brought originally into being by Sir Alister Hardy, F.R.S., Emeritus Professor of Zoology at Oxford. He considers parapsychology an essential aspect of the study of evolution, is the present President of the Society for Psychical Research, and his Gifford Lectures 1963–5 (*The Living Stream* and *The Divine Flame*) have made a significant impact on public thought.

In "An Experiment with God," John Wren-Lewis (*New Scientist,* 17 April 1969) depicts the background of this movement, pointing out the phenomenal increase (even in just the past few years), of interest in religion as religion, distinct from institutionalized or conventional religions. It is among the young people that it has mainly sprung

up, and though its public expression has, to a large extent, been associated with pop music, and carries along with it a good measure of "weirdie" notions, dress, and behaviour, there is more to the movement than these would indicate. Mr. Wren-Lewis recognizes that "the occult and unorthodox religious groups which have been springing up all over the Western world during the past decade," include as members quite a few serious trained and working scientists. The word "scientist" must not always be equated with a materialist who has made of "science" yet another exclusive and dogmatic religion. He examines the psychological reasons why people do this, and why the younger generation protest both against the serfdom of technological domination and the procrustean theological frame of reference. They revolt

> because they want to take seriously the experience of the inner life — in particular, experience of the "numinous" and of "immortal longings" — even when it seems to contradict what science is commonly supposed to have revealed about the essentially material nature of reality.

They do not feel that the only hope for mankind is in social improvement through technology, but seek to expand the field of experience by such means as "meditation, prayer, ritual and even drugs if necessary in defiance of what seems sensible or intellectually respectable to common opinion." They are prepared to accept such unacceptable ideas as reincarnation and astrology, because their exploratory concern with religious experience is more important to them than are the ideas held, and science must show that it is not opposed to personal values, by demonstrating in practice "the spirit of openness which is the real essence of science."

What the Unit will be working for — the acceptance and understanding of the higher, religious or spiritual, states of consciousness — is a step forward. It remains to be seen how it will be worked out. It must not become merely a case-selecting, fact-collecting body, as the Society for Psychical Research has tended to be. It is to be hoped that the new group, while still maintaining scientific disciplines, will go further than that.

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The same issue of the *New Scientist* gives an enthusiastic welcome to the new British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (BSSRS), whose inaugural meeting was held at the Royal Society, London, 19 April 1969. It also includes an article, "Knowledge and Power," by two founder members, Hilary Rose and Dr. Steven Rose, on the purpose of the society. The rapid growth of specialized science and technology, without any attention to social and moral relationships with the community, has reached a point where it is no longer possible to ignore the dangers and injustices created by this separative outlook and the consequent misuse of science. The general feeling of alarm, about a year ago, aroused by the details of chemical and biological warfare research, watered the seeds of doubt about such scientific experiment and invention, and its ethical implications. Concern about the development of projects such as Apollo or Concorde, "genetic engineering," test-tube babies and so on, all added their quota to the growing dismay. And, since science has no "clear-cut statement" of the ethical responsibilities incurred by its representatives, unlike medicine with its traditional Hippocratic oath, the need for the BSSRS become evident.

Its aims fall broadly into two categories. The inward-turning aim is to formulate an ethical code which would be acceptable to, and recognized by, practising scientists and technologists — the majority at least — and to define breaches in such a code. The education of the general public would form the outward-turning aim. It should be the task of the scientists to see that society has sufficient data on possible social consequences of scientific research, so that the matter can be openly discussed, and decisions made "in a public and responsible manner" on the basis of the necessary information given. A govern-

ment should not force through projects because it has become blindly involved in political and financial commitments. Thus, the BSSRS is open both to scientists and to members of the public. It realizes there are bound to be difficulties, including unpopularity with vested interests, and the apathy of the thoughtless mass. But, as the *New Scientist* Editorial comments:

> If the new BSSRS can both identify potential trouble-spots in science at an early stage, and (as the Roman Catholic Church puts it) "inform the conscience" of scientists about the implications of their work, they will perform an invaluable service.

There is controversy at present over the dangers of contraceptive pills. Three separate research surveys in Britain have concluded that women taking the pill run an eightfold risk of developing a thrombosis more than those using other methods, and a threefold risk of phlebitis. Hypertension, jaundice, and a reduced tolerance of carbohydrates are other side-effects noted. Professor James Webster, Home Office pathologist, at an inquest on a twenty-nine-year-old mother, who died from a thrombosis accompanied by intra-cranial vascular catastrophe, stated:

> I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying that this young woman died from the effects of taking what is in my opinion a very dangerous medicament. (*The Guardian,* 19 April 1969)

The dangers are played down, however, by various reports (e.g., the Dunlop Committee on the Safety of Drugs) stating that the pill is still an acceptable risk, less than that of death in a car accident, or less than becoming pregnant. Official American opinion still holds aloof from acceptance of the warning about thrombosis. On the other hand, some research studies in America suggest a high incidence of cervical cancer in pill-takers, though this, too, is considered a controversial conclusion (*The Guardian,* 15 April 1969). Long-term studies continue to be made in both countries. That these will eventually show the tragic folly of such abuses of the bodily temple and its procreative powers (divine in their origin) is the conviction of all those who endeavour to live by Universals, by principles that are natural. The general use of empiric, desire-directed techniques, and the subsequent observation of the particulars of the effects, and eventually a reluctant admission of dangers hitherto unthought of and unrecognized, is far too prolonged and inefficient. It still cruelly claims its holocausts of victims, long after the medical profession have seen and proclaimed the dangers of certain seeming "desirables," and even after the manufacturers have begun turning to other commodities, in self-interest (cigarette-smoking is a case is point).

Gandhi's writings included *Self-Restraint versus Self-Indulgence* (this should be applied not only to sex, but to other aspects of living also). At the present time the teacher is being honoured, yet surely he would value far more than any personal praise the effective dissemination of his teachings.

Truth in our time appears to be a receding rather than an approaching star. There is no end to the philosophical systems offered for our acceptance. To which, then, should we incline? If we are not to abandon speculation, all thought upon the matter, shrug our shoulders at the tilts and tournaments going on everywhere around us, and end where we began, the only course is to accept, till intellect and imagination amend it, that way of thought which seems to leave the fewest difficulties upon our hands, and to account for the greatest number of our experiences. We do well constantly to remind ourselves that we are learning merely the alphabet of reality, and can only proceed with "a kind of hesitating confidence," as Plato described it, in our reason.

—W. MACNEILE DIXON